Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field

Englmaier, Florian und Leider, Stephen (2020): Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field. In: Review of Industrial Organization, Bd. 56, Nr. 2: S. 259-280

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in ability and reciprocal inclination and show that gift-exchange is more effective with more reciprocal agents. We present a principal-agent model with reciprocal subjects that motivates our findings. Our results help to reconcile the conflicting evidence on the efficacy of gift-exchange outside the lab.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• ISSN: 0889-938X
• Sprache: Englisch