Abstract
Recent work on the hole argument in general relativity by Weatherall (Br J Philos Sci 69(2):329-350, 2018) has drawn attention to the neglected concept of (mathematical) models' representational capacities. I argue for several theses about the structure of these capacities, including that they should be understood not as many-to-one relations from models to the world, but in general as many-to-many relations constrained by the models' isomorphisms. I then compare these ideas with a recent argument by Belot (Nous, 2017. 10.1111/nous.12200) for the claim that some isometries "generate new possibilities" in general relativity. Philosophical orthodoxy, by contrast, denies this. Properly understanding the role of representational capacities, I argue, reveals how Belot's rejection of orthodoxy does not go far enough, and makes better sense of our practices in theorizing about spacetime.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0015-9018 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 88383 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 25. Jan. 2022, 09:27 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 25. Jan. 2022, 09:27 |