Abstract
Why take individual action against collectively caused evils such as climate change? Prima facie, one's individual contribution may seem to make a negligible difference at best. Consequentialists as well as consequence-sensitive nonconsequentialists should be interested in whether a consequence-based justification for taking individual climate action can be found nonetheless. The author argues that even though individual agents are able to make a non-zero difference in expectation, the altruistic expected value may be so small as to be insufficiently worthwhile, given the agents' opportunity cost. In this case, altruistic agents may face a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), i.e. an altruistic public goods problem. Hence, the consequence-based account of why to leave one's car at home could be vindicated if the PD can be solved in a consequence-based way. The author offers tentative grounds for optimism about solving the PD in a consequence-based way, and for acting accordingly.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0165-9227 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 88437 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 25. Jan. 2022, 09:27 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 25. Jan. 2022, 09:27 |