Kant's Conception of Theodicy and his Argument from Metaphysical Evil against it

Kravitz, Amit (2020): Kant's Conception of Theodicy and his Argument from Metaphysical Evil against it. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 102, No. 3: pp. 453-476

Abstract

A series of attempts have been made to determine Kant's exact position towards theodicy, and to understand whether it is a direct consequence of his critical philosophy or, rather, whether it is merely linked to some inner development within his critical philosophy. However, I argue that the question of Kant's critical relation to theodicy has been misunderstood;and that in fact, Kant redefines the essence of the theodicean question anew. After introducing some major aspects of Kant`s new conception of theodicy, I show how understanding this conception is necessary for correctly analysing his specific arguments against theodicy. I demonstrate this point by examining Kant's second argument against theodicy, in which he tackles the Leibnizian problem of `metaphysical evil', and show why, in light of the above, interpretations thus far have failed to capture the essence of Kant's claim in this regard.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 0003-9101
• Language: English