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Buchheim, Thomas (2020): Freiheit unter Bedingungen der Zeit? Schellings neuer Zeitbegriff im Nachgang zurFreiheitsschrift. In: Kant-Studien, Vol. 111, No. 2: pp. 191-223
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Abstract

The concept of human freedom developed by Schelling in the Freiheitsschrift (1809) prompted him to explore a new concept of time in his Weltalter project. Schelling proposes the 'generic subjectivity of time': Time must be understood not as a precondition of dynamism, but rather as an effect of dynamic agency. The articulation of time into its moments, 'presence', 'past', and 'future', is realized through the dynamic contributions (motion, causality, and action) of every single causally involved being. Schelling's concept thus fundamentally differs from Kant's concept of time. For Kant, change and dynamism are located in the sensible world, whereas time (as well as space) is the subjective form of our sensible intuition. As such, time must be seen as a precondition of change and dynamism for Kant.