GOD, PERSONHOOD, AND INFINITY: AGAINST A HICKIAN ARGUMENT

Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh (2020): GOD, PERSONHOOD, AND INFINITY: AGAINST A HICKIAN ARGUMENT. In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Bd. 12, Nr. 1: S. 61-74

Abstract

Criticizing Richard Swinburne's conception of God, John Hick argues that God cannot be personal because infinity and personhood are mutually incompatible. An essential characteristic of a person, Hick claims, is having a boundary which distinguishes that person from other persons. But having a boundary is incompatible with being infinite. Infinite beings are unbounded. Hence God cannot be thought of as an infinite person. In this paper, I argue that the Hickian argument is flawed because boundedness is an equivocal notion: in one sense it is not essential to personhood, and in another sense - which is essential to personhood - it is compatible with being infinite.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
• ISSN: 1689-8311
• Sprache: Englisch