Abstract
In cooperative game theory bargaining games refer to situations where players can agree to any one of a variety of outcomes but there is a conflict on which specific outcome to choose. However, the players cannot impose a specific outcome on others and if no agreement is reached all players receive a predetermined status quo outcome. Bargaining games have been studied from a variety of fields, including game theory, economics, psychology and simulation based methods like genetic algorithms. In this work we extend the analysis by means of deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). To study the dynamics of bargaining with reinforcement learning we propose two different bargaining environments which display the following situations: in the first domain two agents have to agree on the division of an asset, e.g., the division of a fixed amount of money between each other. The second domain models a seller-buyer scenario in which agents must agree on a price for a product. We empirically demonstrate that the bargaining result under MARL is influenced by agents' risk-aversion as well as information asymmetry between agents.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Mathematics, Computer Science and Statistics > Computer Science |
Subjects: | 000 Computer science, information and general works > 004 Data processing computer science |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 89078 |
Date Deposited: | 25. Jan 2022, 09:28 |
Last Modified: | 25. Jan 2022, 09:28 |