Logo Logo
Hilfe
Hilfe
Switch Language to English

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta und Seres, Gyula (25. Januar 2022): Anchored Strategic Reasoning. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 314 [PDF, 409kB]

[thumbnail of 314.pdf]
Vorschau
Download (409kB)

Abstract

Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

Dokument bearbeiten Dokument bearbeiten