Abstract
We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | collective branding, reputation, free-riding, repeated games, imperfect monitoring |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-91926-6 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 91926 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 21. Apr. 2022, 07:35 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 21. Apr. 2022, 07:35 |