Abstract
We study the implications of biased consumer beliefs for search market outcomes in the seminal framework due to Diamond (1971). Biased consumers base their search strategy on a belief function which specifies for any (true) distribution of utility offers in the market a possibly incorrect distribution of utility offers. If biased consumers overestimate the best offer in the market, a novel type of equilibrium may emerge in which firms make exceptionally favourable offers in order to meet biased consumers' unreasonable high expectations which then become partially self-fulfilling. Consequently, the presence of biased consumers may improve the welfare of all consumers.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | consumer search; bounded rationality; cursed beliefs |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D18, D21, D43, D83 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-94017-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 94017 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 03. Jan. 2023, 07:50 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 03. Jan. 2023, 08:04 |