Abstract
We study the implications of biased consumer beliefs for search market outcomes in the seminal framework due to Diamond (1971). Biased consumers base their search strategy on a belief function which specifies for any (true) distribution of utility offers in the market a possibly incorrect distribution of utility offers. If biased consumers overestimate the best offer in the market, a novel type of equilibrium may emerge in which firms make exceptionally favourable offers in order to meet biased consumers' unreasonable high expectations which then become partially self-fulfilling. Consequently, the presence of biased consumers may improve the welfare of all consumers.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | consumer search; bounded rationality; cursed beliefs |
| Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D18, D21, D43, D83 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-94017-8 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 94017 |
| Date Deposited: | 03. Jan 2023 07:50 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Jan 2023 08:04 |

