Abstract
A large body of literature finds that managerial overconfidence increases risk-taking by financial institutions. This paper shows that financial regulation can be effective at mitigating this type of risk. Exploiting regulatory changes introduced after the financial crisis as a natural experiment, I find that overconfidence-induced risk-taking decreases in financial institutions subject to stricter regulation. Following the easing of these regulations, overconfidence-induced risk-taking increases again. These findings confirm the effectiveness of financial regulation at correcting overconfident behavior, but also suggest that the impact fades away quickly once removed.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | overconfidence; risk; regulation; financial sector |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | G28, G32, G38, G40 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-94413-7 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 94413 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 06. Feb. 2023, 09:39 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 06. Feb. 2023, 09:41 |