ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7205-4778
(2022):
Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences.
In: Emotion Review, Vol. 14, No. 3: pp. 206-216
[PDF, 256kB]
Abstract
This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-95005-6 |
ISSN: | 1754-0739 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 95005 |
Date Deposited: | 09. Mar 2023, 09:57 |
Last Modified: | 04. Jan 2024, 11:23 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |