Abstract
Reviews recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms (hausbank-relationships). We differentiate between the role of banks as monitors and financiers of large, exchange-listed firms and of smaller, non-listed firms. Sub-sections of the chapter deal with direct shareholdings, proxy-voting rights, supervisory board representation, debt financing, and distress resolution. The accumulated evidence supports the idea that relationship lending plays a distinctive role in German firms’ corporate governance, and will continue to influence the future development of the financial system.
Dokumententyp: | Buchbeitrag |
---|---|
Keywords: | corporate governance, debt financing, house-bank/hausbank, proxy-voting, relationship lending, shareholdings, supervisory board |
Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Finance und Banking |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 978-0-19-9253-16-6 (print) ; 978-0-19-160165-1 (online) |
Ort: | Oxford |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 96436 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 13. Jun. 2023, 06:15 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 13. Jun. 2023, 06:15 |