Abstract
Reviews recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms (hausbank-relationships). We differentiate between the role of banks as monitors and financiers of large, exchange-listed firms and of smaller, non-listed firms. Sub-sections of the chapter deal with direct shareholdings, proxy-voting rights, supervisory board representation, debt financing, and distress resolution. The accumulated evidence supports the idea that relationship lending plays a distinctive role in German firms’ corporate governance, and will continue to influence the future development of the financial system.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Keywords: | corporate governance, debt financing, house-bank/hausbank, proxy-voting, relationship lending, shareholdings, supervisory board |
Faculties: | Munich School of Management > Institute for Finance and Banking |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
ISSN: | 978-0-19-9253-16-6 (print) ; 978-0-19-160165-1 (online) |
Place of Publication: | Oxford |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 96436 |
Date Deposited: | 13. Jun 2023, 06:15 |
Last Modified: | 13. Jun 2023, 06:15 |