Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with los expected cash-flows or high asset specificity prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high asset specificity tend to finance without relationship bank.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | relationship lending, multiple bank financing, lender coordination |
Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Finance und Banking |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 96443 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 13. Jun. 2023, 07:24 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 13. Jun. 2023, 07:24 |