Abstract
This article examines whether there is a morally relevant difference between adolescents and adults even if both are similarly autonomous. Understanding that difference accounts for the particular moral significance of adolescence and explains what we owe to adolescents as individual members of that age group. I first raise the plausibility of this morally relevant difference by highlighting the difficulties that any attempts would face which try to assimilate adolescents to either adults or children. I then consider two recent proposals that have been made in the literature in support of the moral significance of adolescence and show that none of them can adequately account for it. In light of this diagnosis, I advance the Relational View according to which it is necessary for the development of adolescents' autonomous capacities that they are supported in both their self-governance and self-authorisation in close relationships while they are adolescent. As a result, the morally relevant difference between adolescents and adults consists in the fact that close relationships and the support they provide are necessary for adolescents to become skilled autonomous agents but only causally relevant for adults. An implication of this view is that paternalism is justified only in rare cases, and that friendships and partnerships later in life are unable to make up for what has been missed during adolescence.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0264-3758 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 96993 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 05. Jun. 2023, 15:24 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 05. Jun. 2023, 15:24 |