'Ultimate Responsibility' without causa sui

Buchheim, Thomas (2021): 'Ultimate Responsibility' without causa sui. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch, Vol. 128, No. 2: pp. 228-245

Abstract

Since the mid-1980s, Galen Strawson has introduced an argument into the analytic debate about the concept and possibility of freedom. He has repeated and defended it in various formulations, which amounts to an impossibilism of freedom in the moral sense, i.e., to the impossibility that we can be called ultimately responsible for the moral quality of our actions based on existing freedom in the full sense. In this paper, I want to explain Strawson's argument, which is supposed to prove this intuitive difficulty as impossible to fulfill, and to show the conditions of its persuasiveness. Furthermore, I will make clear how and by what right philosophers like Kant, Fichte and especially Schelling were able to evade this argument avant la lettre by introducing the concept of an intelligible self-constituting act of freedom.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 0031-8183
• Language: English