Abstract
In this paper, we extend the study on combined tax and infrastructure competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by asymmetric countries. We consider how a structural fund affects the endogenous move decision and show that the poor country prefers to be a follower only when the production function is sufficiently concave. We also analyse the effect of the structural fund on total welfare and design a commitment game to ensure that the socially optimal outcome is achieved.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0927-5940 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 97860 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 05. Jun. 2023, 15:27 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 17. Okt. 2023, 14:56 |