Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time

Hedegaard, Morten; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Mueller, Daniel und Tyran, Jean-Robert (2021): Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time. In: Games and Economic Behavior, Bd. 128: S. 231-255

Abstract

We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a trust game and a public good game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game and contribute more to the public good than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time. (C) 2021 ELSEVIER. All rights reserved.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• ISSN: 0899-8256
• Sprache: Englisch