Abstract
Indicative conditionals-that is, sentences typically, though not exclusively, of the form If p, (then) q,-belong to the most puzzling phenomena of language. One of the puzzles that has recently attracted attention of psy-chologists of reasoning stems from the fact that on the majority of accounts of indicative conditionals, If p, (then) q can be true, or at least highly acceptable, even when there is no meaningful connection between p and q. Conditionals without such a connection, dubbed missing-link conditionals, however, often seem very odd. A standard pragmatic account of their oddity rests on an observation that, whenever missing-link conditionals come out as true, these are situations in which speakers are justified in asserting stronger, more informative statements. Asserting a less informative statement is odd because it is a violation of the Maxim of Quantity. This paper reports four experiments that present a challenge to the Gricean explanation of why missing-link condi-tionals are odd. At the same time, we will argue that these findings can be reconciled with general principles of Gricean pragmatics, if the connection is treated as a part of a conventional, core meaning of a conditional.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 0749-596X |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 99845 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 05. Jun. 2023, 15:33 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 05. Jun. 2023, 15:33 |