|
Eine Ebene nach oben |
Gruppiert nach:
Dokumententyp
| Veröffentlichungsdatum
Springe zu: Zeitschriftenartikel | Paper
Anzahl der Publikationen: 6
Zeitschriftenartikel
Sabac, Florin; Hofmann, Christian; Feltham, Gerald A. und Christensen, Peter O.
(2022):
Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts.
In: Foundations and Trends in Accounting, Bd. 17, Nr. 1: S. 1-76
Feltham, Gerald A.; Hofmann, Christian 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520 und Indjejikian, Raffi J.
(2016):
Performance Aggregation and Decentralized Contracting.
In: Accounting Review, Bd. 91, Nr. 1: S. 99-117
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520 und Indjejikian, Raffi J.
(2016):
Performance Aggregation and Decentralized Contracting.
In: Accounting Review, Bd. 91, Nr. 1: S. 99-117
Feltham, Gerald A. und Hofmann, Christian ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(2012):
Information suppression in multi-agent contracting.
In: Review of Accounting Studies, Bd. 17, Nr. 2: S. 254-278
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(2012):
Information suppression in multi-agent contracting.
In: Review of Accounting Studies, Bd. 17, Nr. 2: S. 254-278
Feltham, Gerald A. und Hofmann, Christian ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(2010):
Limited Commitment in Multi-agent Contracting*.
In: Contemporary Accounting Research, Bd. 24, Nr. 2: S. 345-375
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(2010):
Limited Commitment in Multi-agent Contracting*.
In: Contemporary Accounting Research, Bd. 24, Nr. 2: S. 345-375
Paper
Feltham, Gerald A. und Hofmann, Christian ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(25. Juli 2007):
Delegated Contracting.
SSRN
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(25. Juli 2007):
Delegated Contracting.
SSRN
Feltham, Gerald A. und Hofmann, Christian ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(6. Mai 2005):
Limited Commitment in Multi-agent Contracting.
SSRN
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0700-6520
(6. Mai 2005):
Limited Commitment in Multi-agent Contracting.
SSRN