Abstract
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule ``imitate the best.'' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on {\em intermediate} values of the policy instrument.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Publikationsform: | Preprint |
Keywords: | Open Method of Coordination, Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Imitation, Mobility, Redistribution. |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Finanzwissenschaft Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Spieltheorie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | H77, H75, C73 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 10332 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 19. Mrz. 2009, 09:15 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016, 09:05 |
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- The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process. (deposited 19. Mrz. 2009, 09:15) [momentan angezeigt]