
Abstract
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule ``imitate the best.'' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on {\em intermediate} values of the policy instrument.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Preprint |
| Keywords: | Open Method of Coordination, Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Imitation, Mobility, Redistribution. |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Public Finance Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Game Theory |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | H77, H75, C73 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 10332 |
| Date Deposited: | 19. Mar 2009 09:15 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:05 |
Available Versions of this Item
- The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process. (deposited 19. Mar 2009 09:15) [Currently Displayed]
