Abstract
Consider a situation where person A undertakes a costly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by the expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to the intentions of A. We vary the probability, with which the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate, and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that the perceived kindness and its rewards are not spoiled by expected rewards.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Publikationsform: | Preprint |
Keywords: | social preferences, intentions, beliefs, psychological game theory, experiment |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Mikroökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Verhaltenswissenschaftliche Ökonomik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D02, C91, D64 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10351-3 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 10351 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 20. Mrz. 2009, 08:50 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 18:20 |