Abstract
Consider a situation where person A undertakes a costly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by the expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to the intentions of A. We vary the probability, with which the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate, and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that the perceived kindness and its rewards are not spoiled by expected rewards.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Form of publication: | Preprint |
Keywords: | social preferences, intentions, beliefs, psychological game theory, experiment |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Micro-Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Behavioral Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D02, C91, D64 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10351-3 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 10351 |
Date Deposited: | 20. Mar 2009, 08:50 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 18:20 |