Abstract
I propose a non-Humean theory of causation with “tendencies” as causal connections. Not, however, as “necessary connexions”: causes are not sufficient, they do not necessitate their effects. The theory is designed to be, not an analysis of the concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causa-tion. I therefore call it a metaphysical theory of causation, as opposed to a semantic one.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Publikationsform: | Preprint |
Keywords: | philosophy, metaphysics, causation, tendency |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 110 Metaphysik |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10628-1 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 10628 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 22. Jun. 2009, 15:23 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:52 |