
Abstract
I propose a non-Humean theory of causation with “tendencies” as causal connections. Not, however, as “necessary connexions”: causes are not sufficient, they do not necessitate their effects. The theory is designed to be, not an analysis of the concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causa-tion. I therefore call it a metaphysical theory of causation, as opposed to a semantic one.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Form of publication: | Preprint |
Keywords: | philosophy, metaphysics, causation, tendency |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 110 Metaphysics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10628-1 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 10628 |
Date Deposited: | 22. Jun 2009, 15:23 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:52 |