Abstract
This paper argues that there are true synthetic modal claims and that modal questions in philosophy are to be interpreted not in terms of logical necessity but in terms of synthetic necessity. I begin by sketching the debate about modality between logical empiricism and phenome-nology. Logical empiricism taught us to equate analyticity and neces-sity. The now common view is that analytic statements are necessary in the narrow sense but that there is also necessity in a wider sense. I argue against this that we should distinguish analyticity and necessity more strictly.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Publikationsform: | Preprint |
Keywords: | philosophy, metaphysics, modality, possibility, necessity, possible worlds |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 110 Metaphysik |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10629-1 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 10629 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 22. Jun. 2009, 15:22 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:52 |