Abstract
The German health care reform of 2004 imposes a charge of 10 Euro for the first visit to a doctor in each quarter of the year. At first glance, there is no inhibiting effect of this fee on utilization in the German Socio-Economic Panel. However, this study reveals that the true effect is diluted by a special characteristic of the fee. Exploiting random variation in the interview date, this study finds a substantial effect of the new fee on the probability of visiting a physician. In addition, the identification strategy makes it possible to disentangle this effect from the influence of the contemporaneous increase of copayments for prescription drugs.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Publikationsform: | Submitted Version |
| Keywords: | copayment, moral hazard, differences-in-differences |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Wirtschaftspolitik |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | I18, I11 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10951-1 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 10951 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 16. Jul. 2009 08:58 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 16:09 |

