Abstract
The German health care reform of 2004 imposes a charge of 10 Euro for the first visit to a doctor in each quarter of the year. At first glance, there is no inhibiting effect of this fee on utilization in the German Socio-Economic Panel. However, this study reveals that the true effect is diluted by a special characteristic of the fee. Exploiting random variation in the interview date, this study finds a substantial effect of the new fee on the probability of visiting a physician. In addition, the identification strategy makes it possible to disentangle this effect from the influence of the contemporaneous increase of copayments for prescription drugs.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Form of publication: | Submitted Version |
Keywords: | copayment, moral hazard, differences-in-differences |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | I18, I11 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-10951-1 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 10951 |
Date Deposited: | 16. Jul 2009, 08:58 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 16:09 |