Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment

Kocher, Martin G.; Lenz, Marc V. and Sutter, Matthias (March 2010): Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment. Discussion Papers in Economics 2010-18

Abstract

Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.

• Item Type: Paper
• Form of publication: Preprint
• Keywords: Tournament, first-mover advantage, psychological pressure, field experiment, soccer, penalty shootouts
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Behavioral Economics; Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology; 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C93
• Language: English

References

Apesteguia, Jose, and Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. Forthcoming. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence From a Randomized Natural Experiment." American Economic Review.

Ariely, Dan, Uri Gneezy, George Loewenstein, and Nina Mazar. 2009. "Large Stakes and Big Mistakes." Review of Economic Studies 76(2): 451-470.

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Steven Levitt, and Timothy Groseclose. 2002. Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer. American Economic Review 92(4): 1138-1151.

Harrison, Glenn, and John A. List. 2004. "Field Experiments." Journal of Economic Literature XLII(4): 1013-1059.

Ionescu, Romeo. 2003. The Complete Results & Line-Ups of the European Fairs Cup 1955-1971. Cleethorpes: Soccer Books Limited.

Ionescu, Romeo. 2004a. The Complete Results & Line-Ups of the European Champion Clubs' Cup 1955-1991 - The Knockout Years. Cleethorpes: Soccer Books Limited.

Ionescu, Romeo. 2004b. The Complete Results & Line-Ups of the European Champions League 1991-2004. Cleethorpes: Soccer Books Limited.

Ionescu, Romeo. 2004c. The Complete Results & Line-Ups of the European Cup Winners' Cup 1960-1999. Cleethorpes: Soccer Books Limited.

Ionescu, Romeo. 2004d. The Complete Results & Line-Ups of the UEFA Cup 1991-2004. Cleethorpes: Soccer Books Limited.

Ionescu, Romeo. 2004e. The Complete Results & Line-Ups of the UEFA Cup 1971-1991. Cleethorpes: Soccer Books Limited.

Kocher, Martin G., Marc V. Lenz, and Matthias Sutter. 2008. "Performance Under Pressure - The Case of Penalty Shootouts in Football." In: Patric Andersson, Peter Ayton, and Carsten Schmidt (eds.). Myths and Facts about Football: The Economics and Psychology of the World's Greatest Sport. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 61-72.

Levitt, Steven, John List, and David Reiley. Forthcoming. "What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Professionals Do Not Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments." Econometrica.

Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, and Oscar Volij. 2008. "Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments." Econometrica 76(1): 71-115.

Walker, Marc, John Wooders, and Rabah Amir. 2009. "Equilibrium Play in Matches: Binary Markov Games." University of Arizona, Working Paper.

Wooders, John. Forthcoming. "Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab." Econometrica.

Wooders, John. 2008. "Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab." University of Arizona, Department of Economics. Working Paper.