Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

Ludwig, Sandra; Wichardt, Philipp C. und Wickhorst, Hanke (5. Juli 2010): Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests. Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL) 2010-35

Abstract

This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage for the overconfident agent in absolute terms.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Publikationsform: Preprint
• Keywords: Overconfidence, Contests
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie ; 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D21, D44, D82
• Sprache: Englisch