Bringing good and bad Whistle-blowers to the Lab

Schikora, Jan Theodor (1. März 2011): Bringing good and bad Whistle-blowers to the Lab. Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (VWL) 2011-4

Abstract

Whistle-blowing is seen as a powerful tool in containing corruption, although theoretical findings and experimental evidence cast doubt on its effectiveness. We expand a standard corruption model by allowing both, briber and official to initiate corruption actively, in order to assess the full effect of whistle-blowing. In our laboratory experiment we find that the effect of symmetrically punished whistle-blowing is ambiguous since it reduces the impact of corruption on productive activity, but also increases its stability. We show that asymmetric leniency for the official offsets the negative effect. The results can be explained by simple arguments about belief structures within the self-interested model of payoff maximizing.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: Corruption, Experiments, Whistle-blowing, Punishment
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie ; 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: C72, C92, D73
• Sprache: Englisch

Literaturliste

Abbink, K. (2004), “Staff Rotation as an Anti-corruption Policy: an Experimental Study”, European Journal of Political Economy VOL 20, pp 887-906

Abbin k, K. (2006), “Laboratory Experiments on Corruption” in Rose-Ackerman, S. v. ‘International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption’, Cheltenham, pp 418-37

Abbink, K., H. Hennig-Schmidt (2006), “Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment”, Experimental Economics VOL 9/2, pp 103-21

Abbink, K., B. Irlenbusch, E. Renner (2000), “The Moonlighting Game”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization VOL 22, pp 265-77

Abbink, K., B. Irlenbusch, E. Renner (2002), “An Experimental Bribery Game”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization VOL 18/2, pp 428-54

Alatas, V., L. Cameron, A. Chaudhuri, N. Erkal, L. Gangadharan (2006), “Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis”, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 975, The University of Melbourne

Andreoni, J., J. Miller (2002), “Giving according to GARP: An experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism”, Econometrica VOL 70, pp 737-53

Andreoni, J., L. Vesterlund (2001), “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics VOL 116, pp 293-312

Bardhan, P. (1997), “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of Economic Literature VOL 35/3, pp 1320-46

Becker, G. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach”, Journal of Political Economy VOL 78, pp 169-217

Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, K. McCabe (1995), “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History”, Games and Economic Behavior VOL 10, pp 122-42

Buccirossi, P., G. Spagnolo (2006), “Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions”, Journal of Public Economics VOL 90/6;7, pp 1281-97

Charness, G., M. Rabin (2002), “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests”, Quarterly Journal of Economics VOL 117, pp 817-69

Cox, J. (2002), “Trust, Reciprocity, and Other-Regarding Preferences: Groups vs. Individuals and Males vs Females” in Zwick R., A. Rapoport ‘Experimental Business Research’, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 331-49

Croson, R., N. Buchan (1999), “Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games”, Gender and Economic Transactions VOL 89/2, pp 386-91

Croson, R., U. Gneezy (2009), “Gender Differences in Preferences”, Journal of Economic Literature VOL 47/2, pp 448-74

Dollar, D., R. Fisman , R. Gatti (2001), “Are Women Really the Fairer Sex? Corruption and Women in Government”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization VOL 46, pp 423-29

Drew, K. (2003), “Whistle-blowing and Corruption, an Initial and Comparative Review”, PSIRU, London, available at: www.psiru.org

Dusek, L., A. Ortmann, L. Lizal (2004), “Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility through Experiments”, Prague Economic Papers VOL 2, pp 147-62

Eckel, C., P. Grossmann (1996), “The Relative Price of Fairness: Gender Differences in a Punishment Game”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization VOL 30/2, pp 143-58

Falk, A., U. Fischbacher (2006), “A Theory of Reciprocity”, Games and Economic Behavior VOL 54/2, pp 293-315

Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher (2003), “The Nature of Human Altruism”, Nature VOL 425, pp 785-91

Fehr, E., S. Gächter (1998), “Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Emplications of Homo Reciprocans”, European Economic Review VOL 42, pp 845-59

Fehr, E., S. Gächter (2000), “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments”, American Economic Review VOL 90/4, pp 980-94

Fehr, E., S. Gächter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity”, Journal of Economic Perspectives VOL 14/3, pp 159-81

Fehr, E., S. Gächter, G. Kirchsteiger (1997), “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence”, Econometrica VOL 65/4, pp 833-60

Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, A. Riedl (1993), “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics VOL 108, pp 437-59

Fehr, E., K. Schmidt (1999), “Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics VOL 114, pp 817-68

Fischbacher, U. (2007), “Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments”, Experimental Economics VOL 10/2, pp 171-8

Greiner, B. (2004), “An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments” in Kremer, K., V. Macho, ‘Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen’, GWDG Bericht 63, Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung, Göttingen, pp 79-93

Hall, D., S. Davis (1999), “Corruption and Whistle Blower - a background note for TUAC”, PSIRU, London, Available at www.psiru.org/reportsindex.htm

Klitgaard, R. (1988), “Controlling Corruption”, University of California Press

Kreps D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, R. Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma”, Journal of Economic Theory VOL 27, pp 245-52

Lambsdorff, J. Graf, B. Frank (2007), “Corrupt Reciprocity - an Experiment”, Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. V-51-07, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe ISSN 1435-3520

Lambsdorff, J. Graf, B. Frank (2010), “Bribing versus Gift-giving - An Experiment”, Journal of Economic Psychology VOL 31/3, pp 347-57

Lambsdorff, J. Graf, B. Frank (forthcoming), “Gender Effects in Laboratory Corruption Experiments”, Forthcoming in European Journal of Development Research

Lambsdorff, J. Graf, M. Nell (2007), “Fighting Corruption with Asymmetric Penalties and Leniency”, CEGE Discussion Paper ISSN 1439-2305

Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics VOL 110, pp 681-712

Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics”, American Economic Review VOL 83, pp 1281-1302

Rose-Ackerman, S. v. (1999), “Corruption and Government, Causes, Consequences and Reform” in Lambsdorff, J. Graf ‘The New Institutional Economics of Corruption’, Cambridge University Press 1999

Spagnolo, G. (2006), “Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust”, CEPR Discussion Paper 5794

Sung, H.E. (2003), “Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited”, Social Forces VOL 82, pp 703-23

Sutter, M., S. Haigner, M. Kocher (forthcoming), “Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations”, Review of Economic Studies

Swamy, A., S. Knack, Y.Lee, O. Azfar (2001), “Gender and Corruption”, Journal of Development Economics VOL 64, pp 25-55