Abstract
This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates from a sequence of eBay auctions. First the aspect of bidding in a marketplace environment is developed. Form the simple dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with a "reservation bid" for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a similar two-stage procedure as has recently been used when estimating dynamic games it is shown that bidding costs are non-parametrically identified. The procedure is tried on a new data set. The median cost is estimated at less than 2% of transaction prices.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | search models, auctions, eBay, Internet auctions, econometrics of auctions, bidding costs, identification |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrieökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Informationsökonomik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C23, C51, D44, D82, D83, L10, L81 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1234-5 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 1234 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 25. Okt. 2006 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 14:42 |