Abstract
This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates from a sequence of eBay auctions. First the aspect of bidding in a marketplace environment is developed. Form the simple dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with a "reservation bid" for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a similar two-stage procedure as has recently been used when estimating dynamic games it is shown that bidding costs are non-parametrically identified. The procedure is tried on a new data set. The median cost is estimated at less than 2% of transaction prices.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | search models, auctions, eBay, Internet auctions, econometrics of auctions, bidding costs, identification |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrial Organization Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Economics of Information |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C23, C51, D44, D82, D83, L10, L81 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1234-5 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 1234 |
Date Deposited: | 25. Oct 2006 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 14:42 |