
Abstract
This paper argues that liberal theories of justice cannot satisfactorily deal with institutional power. They set out to compare different institutional structures based on criteria which presume an institution-independent ontology of rights and goods. But as soon as it is acknowledged that many properties of goods and rights which are normatively relevant depend ontologically on the existence of particular institutions, and that such institutions necessarily involve specific structures of power, it can be argued that not judgments about rights, equality or welfare, but an assessment of the justice of power relations is the most important task for theories of social justice. The paper explores several strategies for providing such an assessment.
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
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Keywords: | Soziale Gerechtigkeit, Macht, Institution, John Rawls, John Searle, Iris Marion Young, Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Social Justice, Distributive Justice, Power, Institution, John Rawls, John Searle, Iris Marion Young |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy > Philosophy of Law |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-12536-1 |
Language: | German |
Item ID: | 12536 |
Date Deposited: | 23. Dec 2011, 08:18 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |