Abstract
Jonathan Weinberg (2007) criticizes so called armchair philosophers’ appeals to intuitions. Faulty intuitions, so the argument, cannot be detected and corrected since (among other reasons) intuitions cannot be corroborated by external evidence. I press a dilemma against Weinberg. On a broad reading of ‘corroboration’, Weinberg has not established that intuitions lack external corroboration. On a narrow reading, his critique is self-undermining and issues into general skepticism.
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Speech) |
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Keywords: | intuition, experimental philosophy, philosophical methodology, metaphilosophy |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy > Epistemology |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 120 Epistemology 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 190 Modern western philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-12575-7 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 12575 |
Date Deposited: | 03. Jan 2012, 11:16 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |
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