Abstract
In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | high-performance work systems, wages, discretion, gift exchange, job satisfaction |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | M5, J3 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13171-9 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13171 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:05 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
- Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction. (deposited 10. Jul. 2012, 13:05) [momentan angezeigt]