Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy

Heidhues, Paul und Melissas, Nicolas (Februar 2010): Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 306

Abstract

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be taxed. Conversely, any positive investment tax is suboptimally high if the public information is sufficiently unfavorable.We also show that an investment tax may increase overall investment activity.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: Information Externality, Strategic Waiting, Delay, Information Cascade, Investment Boom, Optimal Taxation
• Fakultät: Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A8 - Strategische Erzeugung und Weitergabe von Informationen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D62, D83
• Sprache: Englisch