Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja (June 2009): Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 264 |
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Abstract
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low e?ort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may exploit workers’ future rents to induce excessively high effort.
Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
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Keywords: | bonuses; limited liability; minimum wages |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13288-8 |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 13288 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:53 |
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