Download (222kB)
Abstract
Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng’s construction requires novel conditions — Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance — on the bidders’ value distribution profile. The only known examples of distribution profiles satisfying these conditions in environments with three or more bidders are uniform distributions. Our characterization result shows that Zheng’s conditions, while being strong, are satisfied by many non-uniform distribution profiles. A crucial step in our analysis is to show that Invariance implies Resale Monotonicity and Transitivity.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | independent private values, optimal auction, resale, inverse virtual valuation function |
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A6 - Typenvielfalt, Loyalität und die Bildung von Handelsnetzwerken |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13423-9 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 13423 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:10 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |
- Dokument bearbeiten
