Abstract
Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng’s construction requires novel conditions — Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance — on the bidders’ value distribution profile. The only known examples of distribution profiles satisfying these conditions in environments with three or more bidders are uniform distributions. Our characterization result shows that Zheng’s conditions, while being strong, are satisfied by many non-uniform distribution profiles. A crucial step in our analysis is to show that Invariance implies Resale Monotonicity and Transitivity.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | independent private values, optimal auction, resale, inverse virtual valuation function |
| Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A6 - Typenvielfalt, Loyalität und die Bildung von Handelsnetzwerken |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13423-9 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 13423 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012 13:10 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:53 |
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