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Abstract
We study a fundamental conflict in economic decision-making, the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives, in a new experimental game that nests a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. In a 2×2 design, we let subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal endowments are either task-determined or random. We find that earned endowments lead to less support for redistribution and less cooperation. Subjects' voting is influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, in addition to self-interest. Cooperation rates respond rather continuously to incentives.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C91, C92, D31, D63, H41 |
ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 18172 |
Date Deposited: | 06. Feb 2014, 15:28 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:59 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28)
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:29)
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Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28)
- Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28) [Currently Displayed]
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Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28)
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:29)