
Abstract
We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal incomes that are either task-determined or random. We find subjects' voting to be mainly self-interested but also influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C91, C92, D31, D63, H41 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 18199 |
Date Deposited: | 06. Feb 2014, 15:29 |
Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016, 09:15 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28)
- Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:29) [Currently Displayed]