DeutschClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings
Kolmar, Martin; Meier, Volker (2005): Intra-generational externalities and intergenerational transfers. CESifo Working Paper, 1437
WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.


In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.

Available Versions of this Item