Logo Logo
Hilfe
Hilfe
Switch Language to English

Kolmar, Martin und Meier, Volker (2005): Intra-generational externalities and intergenerational transfers. CESifo Working Paper,

Warnung
Es gibt eine neuere Version des Dokumentes.
Volltext auf 'Open Access LMU' nicht verfügbar.

Abstract

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.

Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes

Dokument bearbeiten Dokument bearbeiten