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Abstract
We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes initially decline, but then rise again as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 19925 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:54 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:01 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay? (deposited 02. Apr 2007)
- Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: The impact of economic integration. (deposited 15. Apr 2014, 08:54) [Currently Displayed]