Abstract
We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes decline, switching from positive to negative levels, and then rise as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | tax and subsidy competition, oligopolistic markets |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Public Finance Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | H25, H73, F15 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1399-9 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 1399 |
Date Deposited: | 02. Apr 2007 |
Last Modified: | 08. Nov 2020, 11:12 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay? (deposited 02. Apr 2007) [Currently Displayed]