Abstract
The paper models the interaction between risk taking in the financial sector and central bank policy. It shows that in the absence of central bank intervention, the incentive of financial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good states may result in excessively low liquidity in bad states. In the prevailing mixed-strategy equilibrium, depositors are worse off than if banks would coordinate on more liquid investment. It is shown that public provision of liquidity improves the allocation, even though it encourages more risk taking (less liquid investment) by private banks.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Liquidity Provision, Monetary Policy, Bank Runs |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Macro-Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Macroeconomics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | E5, G21, G28 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2008-6 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 2008 |
Date Deposited: | 05. Aug 2007 |
Last Modified: | 08. Nov 2020, 11:12 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Liquidity Shortages and Monetary Policy. (deposited 05. Aug 2007) [Currently Displayed]