Dies ist die neueste Version des Dokumentes.
Abstract
In Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort, and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the effect of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 20127 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:56 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:01 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction. (deposited 10. Jul. 2012, 13:05)
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Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction. (deposited 30. Okt. 2012, 18:47)
- Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014, 08:56) [momentan angezeigt]
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Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction. (deposited 30. Okt. 2012, 18:47)